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In a series o f 18 p ro p osition s, th e au th or discusses w hat, in his ju d g em en t, are th e pro blem s affecting p la n n in g and w hat d ecisions will have to be taken in ord er to deal w ith them . In his view , p lan n in g is an im p o rta n t d im en sio n o f th e capacity to g o v ern and, hence, its im p rov em en t can only be attained w ithin the co n tex t o f a g en eral im p rov em en t in the capacity to govern. T o th is end, the author proposes a selec tiv e and radical strategy for ach ievin g m ajo r advan ces in a few cruc<ai c o m p o n e n ts o f th e d ecision -m ak in g process.
P rop o sals made w ith a view to increasing the influ en ce o f p lan n in g in b rin g in g about these advan ces include educating political élites to understand th e p la n n in g process m ore fully and in teg ratin g p la n n in g in to d ecision-m akin g. In addition, p lan ning m ust respond to tw o contrad ictory dem ands: p articip atio n in day-to-day d ecision-m ak in g , on the o n e hand, and the form u lation and assessm en t o f lo n g -term global strateg ies, on th e oth er. In order to co p e w ith these co n flictin g req u irem ents, both the stru ctu re and the techniques o f p lan n in g w ill have to be adapted, and the author m akes a num ber o f sug g estio n s in this regard.
O th e r im p o rtan t p ro p osition s put forw ard in th is a rticle relate, i n te r a lia , to: the auth or's concept o f p lan n in g as "policy g am b lin g " aim ed at dealing w ith th e uncertainty and turbulence o f p resen t cir cu m stan ces; th e need to in co rp o rate social in terests in to sem i-co rp o rate stru ctures; th e creation o f sp e cial o rg an izatio n s fo r th e exp ress pu rpose o f carry ing out d evelop m ent strateg ies fo r overcom ing bureaucratic in ertia; and the "vision ary leadersh ip" w hich should be a featu re o f planning.
• P ro fe s s o r o f P o litica l S cience a t H e b re w U n iv e rs ity in J e ru sa le m , Israel.
Eighteen main propositions

P ro p o sitio n 1: P lan n in g is a m ain fa c e t o f th e "capacity to g o v e r n ", th e term "g o v ern a b ility " b ein g m islead in g in m an y resp ects
The term "governability", while quite fashiona ble, is very misleading in many respects. It implies that the present difficulties of govern ments result from societies and problems having become "ungovernable", the implication there fore being that it is up to societies and other facets of reality to become "governable". While it is true that many societal and other features pose serious challenges to governments, the var iable which should be considered is the "capacity to govern", which may include efforts to make society more governable, but which puts the onus where it belongs. It is up to governments to improve and to develop capacities which enable them to fulfill their tasks under more demanding conditions. "Planning" is a multi-sense term. N everthe less, however, it may be defined for different purposes and in various spheres of discourse, "planning" implies long-range views, interre lated sets of decisions and actions and a high quality of professional reasoning. It should be added that the idea of planning is not that of d irig ism e, since different mixes of State and market roles serve as options for "planning", permitting -and often requiring-various forms and modes of planning.
Correctly understood, the various forms and modes of planning constitute an important dimension of the capacity to govern. This is all the more so when the tasks faced by a society require sustained and long-range efforts, as is the case with development aspirations. In respect to development and to the roles of the State in that regard, planning is essential, in ter alia, to counterbalance political propensities to prefer a short-term view. Similarly, the profes sional reasoning which goes into planning is important in supplying adequate elements of "development rationality". Therefore, one of the recommended frameworks for a consideration of planning within the context of the subject under discussion here is p la n n in g as an essen tia l a
n d o f "d e v e lo p m e n t ca p a c ities" in t h e fa c e o f d im e n s io n o f t h e capacity to g o v e r n in g e n e r a l a d v erse co n d ition s, in particular.
P ro p o sitio n 2 : T h e im p r o v e m e n t o f p la n n in g m ust ta k e p la c e as p a rt o f an e ffo r t to u p g rad e th e "cen tra l m in d " o f g o v e r n m e n t as a w h o le, b a s e d on a " selectiv e-ra d icalism " strateg y f o r retro fittin g t h e S tate
The metaphoric concept of the "central mind of governm ent", which covers the main central governm ent decision-making cluster, is espe cially pertinent to planning. T o be effective, planning must influence the main decision making and decision-implementation processes. This influence on-decision-making can take a variety of forms, ranging from the educating of top decision-makers and the public in general as well as the reshaping of their congnitive maps and attribution theories, to the direct transfor mation of planning recommendations into authoritative "command decisions". N onethe less, all forms of influence by planning depend on interaction with the main decision-making and decision-implementation centres and staffs. Therefore, planning'must be viewed within the c o n te x t of p o licy -m ak in g and policyimplementing systems as a whole; thus, success in augmenting the usefulness of planning will depend, in te r alia, on the introduction of suitable changes in other system components and in the systems as a whole which will make them more receptive to planning inputs. H ence the proposition that the improve ment of planning should take place as part of an im provem ent of the central mind of govern ment as a whole. It follows that issues relating to the upgrading of planning must be considered within the context of the broader issues of the retrofitting of governance in general and of cen tral policy-making and policy-implementing systems in particular; otherwise, it will be impossible to cope with the difficulties sub sumed under the term "ungovernability".
One important aspect is the idea of a selec tively radical reform strategy that goes beyond incremental improvements, which usually are quite worthless, and that rejects presumptions of transforming the entire machinery of govern ment, which is usually impossible and often unnecessary. Instead, a selectively radical reform strategy focuses on the radical improvement of a few critical components, with a number of such improvements being combined in a modular cluster so as to have a significant impact on the performance of the system as a whole with the aid of a limited, and therefore more feasible, set of reforms.
The selective-radicalism reform strategy relates to the upgrading of planning in two main ways: first, if our starting point were the upgrad ing of the central mind of government, this route too would bring us to the necessity of improving planning, because planning is an essential mode for the formulation of development policies. This is important because it justifies efforts to improve planning not only from an internal view of planning, which axiomatically regards it as important, but also from an external view of planning, which assigns it importance because of the essential functions it fulfils as regards devel opment capacity as a whole.
Second, the selective-radicalism reform stra tegy poses the question of what is the minimum set of interdependent improvements which will be essential for upgrading planning. As indi cated above, improving planning, by itself, may be useless and even counterproductive unless the central mind of government is willing and able to utilize planning inputs correctly. Therefore, some concomitant changes in other components of the central mind of governm ent are needed, in addition to improvements in planning activity itself. However, when the goal is to improve planning, the changes in other dimensions of the central mind of government relating to it should be kept to an essential minimum so as to ensure the feasibility of this task.
W ithin such an approach, the components of the central mind of governm ent which must be upgraded in order to improve planning include, for instance, the qualifications of politi cal decision-makers, modes of decision-making management, policy-analysis units serving the top decision-makers and the interfaces between planning and crisis management. The following propositions elaborate upon some of the needs which are integral to the upgrading of planning within the perspectives of the capacity to govern and the capacity to engage in accelerated development.
Broader issues of planning and the capacity to govern, which are often critical, go beyond the scope of this discussion. The elementary needs of political stability and the containment of social violence are taken up in the examination of proposition 18; some relevant issues are dis cussed in relation to other propositions as well. Useful planning, however, depends on some essential aspects of the capacity to govern such as adequate governmental power and a wideranging societal consensus.
Satisfying such requisites must receive prior ity over the upgrading of planning; otherwise the latter is irrelevant. Accordingly, in a number of countries the upgrading of planning should be taken up within a broader approach to the "reform of the State", which should be the first priority.
P ro p o sitio n 3: M uch a tten tio n a n d e ffo r t sh o u ld b e d irected tow ard s u p g rad in g p o licy élites, inclu ding, p o liticia n s
The interrelations between the improvement of planning and the upgrading of policy élites, including politicians, poses crucial issues. These are hard to deal with because of their unconven tional nature and the taboos surrounding them. To put the matter briefly: one main way for planning to exert influence is for it to fulfil didactic functions in respect of policy élites, including politicians, on the one hand, and the public at large, on the other. Furthermore, in order for planning to affect reality for the better, policy élites, including top-level politicians, must be "planning-friendly" in their policy behaviour (as distinct from symbolic declara tions) and have at least some "planning sophisti cation" as part of their intellectual equipment. Therefore, the "education" of policy élites, and especially top decision-makers, should be regarded as one of the main tasks of planning. This has many operational implications, such as the need for "planning briefing units" which can present complex issues and multiple options in ways comprehensible to politicians, thus indi rectly "educating" them.
A different and more demanding conclusion is that new ways of upgrading the qualifications of policy élites need to be devised. This is an important and unconventional requirement, which needs operationalization to clarify its implications and feasibility. Accordingly, the next proposition presents a concrete proposal to set up schools of national policy. It should be noted that there is no contradiction whatsoever between correct democratic theory and efforts to upgrade the quality of policy élites, including politicians. Indeed, in many developing coun tries intensive efforts to improve policy élites are essential, ranging from ways of motivating bright young persons to move into politics and policy-related activities, up to adjustments of electoral procedures to improve the quality of successful candidates. W ithin the limited scope of this article, the only proposal that will be put forward in this respect is the establishment of national policy schools, which are particularly pertinent to planning and relatively more feasi ble as well as faster in producing results than other approaches. However, the need for a broader approach to upgrading policy élites as an essential factor in development should be kept in mind. The subjects to be dealt with at the national policy schools would overlap the main planning concerns; the methods to be presented would relate to advanced planning methodology. Con clusions from projects undertaken at the schools could serve as inputs for planning.
P r o p o s itio n 4: N a tio n a l p o lic y sc h o o ls sh o u ld b e set up as an in teg ra l p a rt o f th e e ffo r t to u p g rad e p la n n in g
Details of structure, staffing, location and content of the national policy schools would depend on particular country situations. In prin ciple, however, it is the author's view that such schools are essential in many countries in order to build up the political culture infrastructure which is basic to planning, as well as to highquality policy-making and the capacity to govern in general.
P ro p o sitio n 5: P lan n in g m u st b e in teg ra ted into current a n d crisis d ecisio n -m a k in g
Unless planning is integrated into current decision-making, its content may become distan ced from reality and its impacts on governmen tal behaviour may approxim ate zero. This is illustrated in the extrem e situation of crisis decision-making. In quite a number of countries, im portant decisions are taken under conditions of economic and debt-handling crises. Unless planning serves as a sort of a "com pass" that will provide guidance in such cases, it will not fulfill its essential role as an im portant aid to decision making and its impact on reality will be much reduced. Therefore, planning must be integra ted, in te r a lia , into crisis decision-making. This can be done in various ways, such as: the pre assignment of appropriate roles to senior plan ning officials in crisis-management teams; the participation of planning officials in designing and running crisis decision-making systems; and the preparation of contingency plans for crisis scenarios in the planning units and with their participation. First, however, the principle that planning should aid in and influence crisis decision-making must be accepted.
Crisis decision-making is an important but special case of the integration of planning. More regular modes of introducing planning into policy-making include: opportunities for plan ners to comment on important decisions on the agendas of governments and top decision makers; the interlocking of the budget process with the planning process, without losing the distinct nature either; suitable procedures for considering planning recommendations at the highest level; etc. The details will need to be adapted to particular circumstances but, in prin ciple, institutionalized modes for integrating planning into current decision-making are a must. Good informal interlocking is also desira ble and often essential, but inadequate by itself.
P ro p o sitio n 6: P lan n in g m ust b e d eta ch ed , at lea st in part, fr o m "t h e h ea t o f t h e m o m e n t "
Three basic causes of the main policy-reasoning weaknesses are: a) ignorance of relevant facts and information: b) inherent difficulties in rea soning on complex situations involving much incertainty, value conflicts, multiple variables, etc.; and c) "motivated irrationality", i.e., the impact of strong emotions, hopes, feelings, ideologies and similar "h ot" variables on reason ing (Pears, 1984; D ror, in preparation).
One of the main functions of planning is to counteract and overcome these prevalent wea knesses in policy-making. In particular, plan ning should be "cold", in the sense of a detached handling of issues, how ever em otionally charged, even while being strongly committed to national goals and development. T o meet this requirement, planning must, at least in part, be detached from the "heat" characteristic of the central mind of governments and the corridors of powers.
P ro p o sitio n 7: In o r d e r to c o p e w ith th e a n tim o n y p o s e d by p r o p o s itio n s 5 a n d 6, a set o f " p la n n in g " units is e s sen tia l, ran gin g fr o m a d v isory units serv in g th o s e w h o g o v e r n to th in k tanks. T h e s e units sh o u ld con stitu te a n e tw o r k as w e ll as an in fo r m a l s c h o o l
The combination of propositions 5 and 6 implies th at planning must m eet contradictory demands: it must be well integrated into the central mind of governm ent and share in the "heat" of the corridors of powers, while also having the ability to remain aloof, at times, from the system. This paradox cannot be coped with satisfactorily within any one unit or process. Therefore, "planning" must be divided among a range of units, each having a double mission, which add up to an aggregated planning activity providing a good mix of contradictory processes. Therefore, a "planning cluster" rather than a single "planning centre" is needed.
T o illustrate the range of components needed in such a planning cluster, let us discuss briefly two of its main elements, which have many contrasting features, but which are both essential and can complement one another: at one extrem e, "planning" requires high-quality advisory units that serve those who govern; at the other extrem e, "planning" requires detached policy research and development organizations analogous to think tanks. Various intermediate entities, such as planning units in the main min istries, are also needed, but the advisory units, at one extreme, and the think tanks, at the other, do serve to illustrate the multiple elements essen tial to a well-performing planning cluster.
A variety of planning units can be integrated within a central ministry of planning, but more is needed, even if the ministry may serve as the centre of the planning cluster. T o achieve coher ence, the various planning units and planning professionals should constitute a network and an informal school in addition to various formal co-ordination and integration procedures and structures.
P ro p o sitio n 8: A p la n n in g core, con stitu tin g a cen tral "islan d o f e x c e lle n c e " h avin g sp ec ia l fe a tu r e s , is essen tia l
The planning cluster requires a core which condistinct planning ministry exists, the core planstitutes an "island of excellence" and which ning unit should be located within it; but it is not serves as the central "planning brain". W hen a identical with the ministry as a whole, which usually also engages in many other necessary activities, such as detailed project programming and evaluation. T o meet the needs of planning for develop ment, such as methodological sophistication and multi-disciplinary knowledge and perspectives, as will be discussed under some of the following propositions, the core planning "island of excel lence" must be of the highest quality and truly interdisciplinary in its composition. Its own planning processes need constant monitoring and improvement. The quality of the planning core's "island of excellence" is critical in deter mining the quality and utility of the planning process as a whole and therefore merits a great deal of attention. This is all the more true in view of the author's empirical finding that existing planning ministries usually do not meet the requirements of a central planning core "island of excellence". "productivity", etc., which will be examined; -Policies designed to encourage innovation; -Regional markets and other forms of multi-national co-operation. E x p e r ie n c e s in J a p a n , th e new ly industrialized nations, France and others show that the design of suitable global development strategies, in principle, is not impossible. However, the challenge is a very considerable one. Therefore planning, as a main mode for successfully meeting the development challenge, must be of very high quality; otherwise it may do much more harm than good. Especially when trends are on a declining curve, as they are now, -planning must concentrate on global development strategies which will permit breakthroughs to be made in the transformation of these trends, rather than on incremental im provisation. This m ost difficult task, involving -as it sometimes does-intervention in deeply-rooted adverse processes, and bold steps designed to "throw history a curve", underscores the need for core-planning "islands of excellence".
P r o p o s itio n 9: T h e m a in ta s k o f ce n tra l p lan n in g , a n d esp ecia lly its co re u nit, is th e d esig n a n d ev alu ation o f g lo b a l stra teg ies f o r d e v e lo p m e n t
P ro p o sitio n 10: In n o v a tiv e n e s s a n d "p o lic y -g a m b lin g " a re essen tia l plan n in g qu alification s
The need for an outstanding quality of planning development is further illustrated by two as a precondition of its usefulness for additional requirements, namely innovativeness and ''policy-gambling''. , 1 9 8 5 ) , two different phases of development policy-making can be distinguished: a) the invention of new options; and b) the screening of the options and their "confirmation" or "refutation" by reality. The present situation of many developing countries, including those of Latin America and the Caribbean, requires -first of all-the invention and design of new global development strategy options, all the existing ones being of doubtful u sefulness at best. T h e re fo re , innovativeness must be a main feature of ad equate p lan n in g . T h is is a difficult requirement to meet, however, because it goes beyond conventional professional knowledge and is dependent upon unusual persons and upon organizational clim ates and social conditions which will encourage innovation.
A p p ly in g a m o d ern p h ilo so p h y -o fknowledge approach (M unz
The "policy-gambling" aspect of planning is different, but no less demanding. Because of environmental turbulence and "ultra-change" (that is, change in the patterns of change itself), planning must cope with much uncertainty; this includes both "hard" uncertainty, which is inherent in the processes involved and therefore can n o t be reduced, and " tr a s c e n d e n t" uncertainty, relating to the very shape of possible futures rather than merely their probabilities. Consequently, all decisions are in essence "blin4 gambles" to some extent, and planning is largely a policy-gambling and policygambling-aiding activity. This view of planning has far-reaching implications for its methods, its relations with politicians, its educational functions and its very nature.
P ro p o sitio n 11: P lan n in g p r o fe s s io n a ls n e e d a g reat d e a l o f im p ro v em en t
The need for innovativeness and the view of planning as policy-gambling are but two illustrations out of many of why the skills of planning professionals must be upgraded. Despite some pioneering efforts, some of them in Latin America (e.g., the experimental program m e of the Escuela de Ciencias y Técnicas de Gobierno in Caracas), the present training of planners does not prepare them adequately for their real tasks and they thus lack essential knowledge and methods. Therefore, upgrading planners' knowledge and revising the way planning professionals think (Schon, 1983 ) are necessary steps, as is an adjustment in the planning expectations of the main policy makers and relevant publics.
In the longer run, novel types of public policy and planning schools will be necessary, perhaps on a regional level. To provide urgently required knowledge and skills, however, crashprogrammes are needed which will rapidly update the skills of existing professionals and provide some insights to the main policy makers. A modular approach of intensive training based on a series of workshops interpolated with sessions of active learning may provide a solution which rapidly upgrades planners' skills in feasible a way.
P r o p o s itio n 12: A q u a s i-c o r p o r a te a p p r o a c h , w ith t h e m ain ec o n o m ic a n d so c ia l b o d ies p a rticip a tin g in t h e p la n n in g p ro cess, is o fte n p r e fe r a b le , but cen tra l d ecis io n -m a k in g a u th o rity m ust b e p r e s e r v e d
Moving on from the "capacity to govern" and approach must be recognized. W ithout dispararelated planning issues to the question of particiging the importance and, often, necessity of pation, the inadequacies of any "com m and" State guidance in many developing countries, once very primitive conditions have been over come and autonomous social and economic insti tutions exist, a co-operative approach involving all the main actors is essential for development planning if it is to have positive effects on reality. T herefore, som e variation of the quasi corporate approach is recommended. Quite a number of illuminating models are to be found in France, the Netherlands, Austria, Japan, the newly industrialized nations of eastern Asia and, in a different form, some projects in the United States. The quasi-corporate structure must be fitted to the particularities of each country but, as a minimum, it should include an integrating mechanism covering the main social and econo mic actors on the political level, and a professio nal network of planning and similar units in the main social and economic organizations on the operational level.
Care must be taken, however, to ensure that the government does not fall captive to social and economic interests, which often are inertiaprone (Olsen, 1982), Reliance on market proces ses and corporate arrangements must be balanced by preserving and upgrading the auto nomy of the State, including its planning pro ce ss. T h is su b je ct re q u ire s s e p a r a te consideration, but should be kept in mind when various forms of "participation" and their expansion are considered. Implementation of such a meta-planning (i.e., planning of planning) policy is difficult, as is interestingly illustrated under the different, but still relevant, conditions of the People's Republic of China. A strong political will is essential in order to actually move in the direc tion of planning delegation.
P r o p o s itio n 13: D e ta ile d p la n n in g a n d its im p le m e n ta tio n sh o u ld b e d eleg a ted w ith a v iew to en cou rag in g " g ra ss-roo ts" in itiativ e an d au ton om y
P ro p o sitio n 14: T en d e n c ie s to c o n tr o l th e m a rk et o r to rely o n it to o m u ch, as w e ll as w ild flu ctu a tio n s b etw e e n th e s e e x tr e m e s , sh o u ld b e a v o id e d
Continuing along the lines of proposition 13, the of the tendency to swing between reducing the need for a consistent policy on the role of the role of the market and intervening in details, on market should be underscored, especially in view the one hand, and eliminating needed controls, on the other hand, as a result of various pres sures, short-range considerations and panicky decision-making. Predictability and some stabil ity are essential prerequisites of adequate market operations. This makes a consistent policy on the roles of the market all the more necessary. Possible biases of planners towards either extrem e must be counteracted, and any change in market roles should be very carefully evaluated before approval.
P ro p o sitio n 15: T h e im p le m e n ta tio n o f m a jo r " b rea k th ro u g h " p ro jec ts calls f o r th e crea tio n o f s p e c ia l org an ization s f o r that p u rp o se
T o balance reliance on participation and on market processes, it is necessary to bear in mind that major development projects and global strategies may require direct governmental action. Such action often cannot be left to exist ing bureaucratic structures, which may be quite unable to carry out innovative and large-scale development activities and projects.
Reform of public bureaucracies as a whole is at best a very slow process and often a hopeless one under real conditions. Therefore, the setting up of special organizations with a strong valuecommitment to novel development policies and projects is often essential for the implementa tion of innovative plans. Such implementation tools should be carefully considered within the planning process itself.
P ro p o sitio n 16: B u ildin g u p p u b lic id en tification w ith d e v e lo p m e n t stra teg ies is a must. T h is in v o lv es: a) realistic v ision s an d) p u b lic en lig h ten m en t
In addition to semi-corporate co-operation with the main social and economic intitutions, mass participation is essential for effective develop ment. T h e unavoidable interim costs of the necessary '"constructive destru ction" make mobilization of mass support all the more essen tial in many Latin American and Caribbean countries. The requirements of mass participation lead from planning into politics and point up the need for "charism a" and visionary leadership as essential factors in the success of ambitious development endeavours. This topic goes beyond the scope of this article, but these ele ments should be recognized as an essential polit ical basis for effective planning which deserve separate consideration.
W ithin the narrower perspectives of plan ning, some things can still be done: planning should provide "realistic visions" and should engage in enlightening activities directed at mobilizing broad support. The activities of the Planning Council of New Zealand provide some examples of ways in which planners can enlighten and inform the public about given policies.
P ro p o sitio n 17: S o cia l p o lic ie s con stitu te an essen tia l ele m e n t o f planning, b o th as a g o a l an d as an in stru m en t
Social policies in the broadest sense of the term, a) In terms of values, development aims must play a part in development planning due to ultimately at providing a "good society" and at at least three types of reasons:
satisfying human individual and collective needs. Additional social requirements of develop ment include human capital production, propen sities to learn and to invest, etc. Taken together, such considerations make social policy an inte gral and central dimension of planning for development. This, in turn, requires many changes in the professional composition and qualifications of planning units, reinforcing ear lier propositions along these lines.
P ro p o sitio n 18: • P o litica l stability a n d th e co n ta in m en t o f so c ia l v io len ce a re essen tial. T h is retu rn s us to t h e n ecessity o f u n d ertakin g im p r o v e m e n ts in p lan n in g w ith in a b r o a d co n tex t o f bu ildin g up th e capacity to g o v ern
This last proposition returns to the starting point, i.e., putting the improvement of planning within the broad context of the capacity to gov ern. Unless a considerable degree of political stability is assured and social violence is con tained, planning for development will be largely in vain. Therefore, when necessary, efforts should first be concentrated on increasing politi cal stability and reducing social violence. These two factors, in turn, depend in part on successful development, as much political instability and social violence stem from economic backward ness, frustrated aspirations and subjective depri vation. There is thus a hidden snare in this situation: the improvement of political stability and containment of social violence depend on successful development, but successful develop ment depends, in turn, on the existence of politi cal stability and the containment of social violence. In situations where political instability and social violence inhibit development, their elimi nation should constitute primary goals for plan ning; efforts to achieve these objectives will, in turn, involve introducing additional dimensions and needed qualifications. Even in many Latin American and Caribbean countries where the political situation at present is stable and social violence is very limited, the spectre of the possi ble re-emergence of these problems should not be lost from sight and their prevention must be an important consideration in planning. This leads into important and sometimes crucial issues which warrant separate consideration.
Conclusion
It is hoped that the 18 propositions set forth above, however rudimentary, will serve the pur pose of posing some of the main issues of "governability, participation and social aspects of planning". Their presentation has been short and to the point in the interest of brevity and with a view to stimulating discussion.
